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Abstract 
In the early 2000s the U.S. Navy decided to replace traditional, instructor led 
schoolhouse training with Computer Based Training (CBT).  The move was 
expected to reduce training cost and time without negatively affecting the quality of 
sailors arriving to the Fleet. If the conversion to CBT were to have an effect 
anywhere in the Navy maintenance system, it should be seen in maintenance 
activities where sailors were performing maintenance on ships. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that CBT failed to sufficiently prepare new sailors for on board 
maintenance and operations.  
To determine the validity of this claim, we examine data for the AN/SQQ-89(v) 
sonar. We analyze whether the US Navy's introduction of CBT significantly affected 
Fleet maintenance costs, actions, and training requirements.  Our results suggest 
that CBT adversely impacts costs, actions, and maintenance hours for the sonar 
system, which seems to support the anecdotal evidence. 
Keywords: system readiness, operations, costs, computer based training 
(CBT), maintenance 
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Implications of Using Computer-Based 
Training on System Readiness and 
Operating & Support Costs 
Introduction 
The majority of specialized skills training (known as class ‘A’ and ‘C’ schools) 
in the United States Navy has traditionally taken place in a classroom setting with 
live instruction.  At the turn of the century Navy leadership became concerned that 
current training programs would not adequately meet future demands.  As a result, 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) chartered an Executive Review of Navy 
Training (ERNT) to review the Navy training system and recommend solutions to 
improve training effectiveness and meet future training demands. 
The ERNT group noted that formal schoolhouse training requires a large 
investment in facilities, instructors, and laboratories and that future training demand 
would exceed capacity.  The ERNT group recommended using new training 
technologies to meet future demands while reducing training costs and time 
(Executive Review of Navy Training (ERNT), 2001).  Motivated by these findings, the 
Navy established Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through Commitment to Education 
and Learning) to develop a continuum of lifelong learning, use a streamlined funding 
process and a single training authority, create a Human Performance Systems 
Model (HPSM), and to link training and acquisition (Naval Personnel Development 
Command, 2002). 
Part of the Navy’s new strategy included the use of new training technologies 
such as distributed learning, computer based training (CBT), collaborative learning, 
and computer-mediated learning. The Navy claimed that the introduction of CBT 
would reduce both training time and training costs without reducing the quality of 
training received (ERNT, 2001).  Accordingly, CBT was introduced full-time into the 
training pipeline in FY2003. 
A 2009 Naval Inspector General (IG) Report, Computer Based Training, 
found that while the introduction of CBT did reduce training time relative to the A and 
C schools, it may not have adequately prepared sailors for their initial duty 
assignments. Anecdotal evidence suggested that sailors trained with CBT did not 
usually meet the required Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Tools (KSATs) to perform 
their duties effectively upon reporting on board. Because of this, ships had to take 
the time to train sailors up to acceptable standards. Initial evidence also suggests 
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that the use of CBT may have transferred these costs to the operational fleet  (Naval 
Inspector General, 2009).  
To understand the operational cost impact of CBT we need to know whether 
CBT reduced the overall cost of operations and maintenance, including on-the-job 
training, unscheduled maintenance actions, and the length of repairs for systems 
requiring intensive education and training. 
In this study we examine the impact of CBT on a single system, the AN/SQQ-
89(v) sonar1, to determine whether CBT significantly altered fleet maintenance costs, 
actions, and training requirements for this system. If CBT has effectively trained 
personnel, then costs, labor hours, and corrective maintenance actions should either 
remain constant or decline. On the other hand, if CBT is an ineffective replacement 
for traditional ‘hands-on’ training, then, after controlling for other factors, costs, labor 
hours, and corrective maintenance actions should increase. We recognize that 
focusing on one system will limit the inferences about CBT’s effect, however, we 
maintain that these inferences will still of be interest to practitioners and 
policymakers alike. 
The next section discusses the Navy’s traditional and computer based 
training. The third section briefly describes Navy maintenance and the fourth section 
describes the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system and the data used in this study. The fifth 
section analyzes whether CBT has affected maintenance costs, actions, or time. The 
last section concludes and offers directions for future research. 
Training 
Navy sailors receive training throughout their careers.  Once a recruit has 
completed basic training, he or she will attend specialized skill training in their 
designated job specialty or “rating.”  In-rate training begins in a class “A” school,2 
where sailors learn the particular skills specific to their job. From there, a sailor may 
also attend additional in-rate training in a “C” school.3  After completing school 
training, the sailor is assigned to an initial duty station, where training will continue 
“on-the-job” as he or she gains real world experience in their specialized skill.   
                                            
1
 The AN/SQQ-89(v) surface ship Anti-Submarine (ASW) Warfare combat system is an integrated 
network of sonar systems designed to search, detect, classify, and engage ASW threats (Lockheed 
Martin, 2009) 
2
 For further information on qualifications for and assignments to class “A” schools, see 




 A submarine Fire Control Technician, for example, attends a 27 to 33 week A school course on 
basic skills, followed potentially by a C school course on advanced maintenance topics, including 
computer language skills and maintenance of specific weaponry.  
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Additionally, sailors can expect to receive general military training in topics ranging 
from electrical safety to suicide prevention.  
Traditional Schoolhouse Training 
Until the early 2000s, the Navy conducted in -rate training in a formal 
schoolhouse setting using subject matter experts (SMEs) to instruct new sailors. 
These instructors typically came from the Fleet and had practical experience with the 
work and responsibilities of newly rated sailors.  In addition, they were able to 
supplement the lecture material with tips and anecdotes from their own career 
experiences  (Naval Inspector General, 2009). 
In the traditional schoolhouse environment sailors could reinforce their 
understanding of the lecture material through hands-on practice in a laboratory 
setting, working on the same equipment they would use and maintain in the Fleet.  
In the laboratory, instructors were able to simulate equipment failures for technicians 
to troubleshoot and students were able to ask questions as they learned. Because 
the instructors were observing and interacting with the students in person, the 
delivery of material (lecture or practical application) could be tailored to improve the 
students’ level of comprehension. For example, if a class had difficulty 
understanding a particular concept, the instructor could choose to spend more time 
in the lab to reinforce what is learned during the classroom portion. 
There are several benefits to Instructor Led Training (ILT). Since a single 
instructor teaches a large group of students, group learning techniques can be 
employed that would otherwise be unavailable in one-on-one or CBT instruction. The 
formation of small groups within a class fosters team-building and allows students to 
help and teach each other. Compared to the costs of software development, testing, 
and hardware purchase, ILT is in some ways more cost-effective, depending on 
class size and length of use. Additionally, the controlled classroom environment 
offers fewer distractions than CBT or distance learning. Finally, ILT doesn’t take as 
long to develop as CBT. It takes approximately 34 hours to develop one hour of ILT 
(Chapman, 2007), while it takes approximately 220 hours to develop a standard e-
learning course (Chapman, 2006). 
ILT also has its disadvantages. Since everyone has different learning 
capabilities, some students may be more advanced and become bored while waiting 
for slower learners to catch up. Conversely, slow learners may have difficulty 
keeping up. Depending on the size and duration of the course, ILT may be more 
expensive than CBT. 
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Revolution in Training 
In October 2000, the Executive Review of Navy Training (ERNT) group was 
charged with providing insights on how to improve and align training organizations, 
leverage civilian training practices, and use new technologies to provide a continuum 
of training for sailors. The 24-member group was comprised of military and civilian 
personnel, members of academia, research institutions, and industry.  In 2001, 
ERNT released their report, Revolution in Training: Executive Review of Navy 
Training Final Report. 
During their review, the ERNT group noted that the demands for training had 
increased.  The ERNT group noted that the finite number of seats available in the 
Navy schoolhouses would not be able to support the increased training demands.  
Because of this, there were gaps in the types of training that current and/or potential 
sailors needed and what could be delivered.  In many cases, this resulted in billets 
which could not be filled because there were no sailors with the required training to 
fill them.   
During the 1990s several other items contributed to the lack of trained sailors.  
First, the pool of experienced sailors had decreased due to drawdowns and 
retirements.  Second, it was difficult to compete for trained personnel in a healthy 
U.S. economy and many trained sailors were leaving for jobs in the civilian sector. 
The ERNT group suggested that technology and the science of learning 
offered several opportunities to improve the Navy training system by reducing 
training time through CBT and offering distributed learning opportunities that could 
be executed at the workplace.  
Computer-Based Training 
Computer-based training or CBT is defined as “individual or group self-paced 
instruction using a computer as the primary training medium, to include web-
delivered Navy E-Learning (NEL)” (Naval Inspector General, 2009, p. ii).  In Navy A 
schools, students go through learning modules on a personal computer at their own 
pace. When a student is done processing the information presented on the screen, 
they click “next” to proceed to the next piece of information. There are usually small 
knowledge assessments throughout the module, followed by a comprehensive 
evaluation at the end of the module (Naval Inspector General, 2009, p. 7). 
Because the learning is self-paced, instructors were replaced with 
“facilitators” who are primarily concerned with maintaining order in the classroom, 
monitoring student progress, and providing technology assistance. Facilitators are 
not necessarily SMEs in the subject matter being delivered in the CBT modules. 
They do not provide instruction or answer questions related to the course content.  
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The removal of instructors from the classroom may have a detrimental effect on 
learning for those students who cannot grasp the material on their own. 
The introduction of CBT in the class A schools has considerably altered the 
nature of instruction. Using a personal computer, sailors can progress through 
learning modules at their own pace or work together in groups to complete the 
course material (Barker, 2010). In 2010 the GAO noted that the fleet had concerns 
over the level of knowledge that sailors reporting to ships from A schools using CBT 
demonstrated.  The Navy IG noted that sailors arriving to the fleet under CBT did not 
usually meet the required Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Tools standards (KSATs) 
and were unfamiliar with the equipment they would be working on and the tools they 
would need to use.  Because of this, ships had to take the time to train sailors up to 
acceptable standards.  In Fleet interviews, some commands reported that specialty 
qualification time was nearly double what it had been before the introduction of CBT 
(Naval Inspector General, 2009). GAO reports in 2010 and 2011 made similar 
observations and concluded that the change to CBT had a negative impact on 
readiness. 
The Navy IG and GAO reports found that while the Navy’s use of CBT 
resulted in cost and training time savings, sailors reporting to the Fleet were not as 
well prepared as ILT-trained sailors of the past. The result is that poorly-trained 
sailors may have contributed to declining material readiness in the Fleet. The next 
section of this study reviews Navy maintenance practices. 
Maintenance 
Navy maintenance occurs on three levels: organizational level (O-level), 
intermediate maintenance (IM) activities, and depot level. This section of the study 
will discuss all three maintenance levels.  
Shipboard maintenance begins with the Planned Maintenance System (PMS). 
PMS is governed by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Instruction 4790.8B, 
Ship’s Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) Manual. The instruction 
outlines the requirements for PMS on shipboard systems and equipment (Naval Sea 
Systems Command, 2003). The purpose of PMS is to provide ships with the means 
to plan, schedule, and perform preventive maintenance onboard and to identify 
potential equipment problems before the equipment fails.   
If corrective maintenance is required, the maintenance is reported, scheduled, 
and performed through organizational level (O-level) shipboard maintenance. Ship 
maintenance actions are reported in Navy Visibility and Management of Operating 
and Support Costs (VAMOSC), under Unit Level Consumption and Manhours—
Organizational Corrective Maintenance. 
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Intermediate maintenance (IM) is “normally performed by Navy personnel 
onboard tenders, repair ships, Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs), 
aircraft carriers, and fleet support bases.” (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2003, pp. 
I-5) IM jobs are deferred corrective maintenance jobs that are beyond the capability 
of ship’s force and are sent off-ship for completion.  IM is tracked in Navy VAMOSC 
under Maintenance – Intermediate. 
Depot level maintenance “requires major overhaul or a complete rebuilding of 
parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end items, including the manufacturing of 
parts, modifications, testing, and reclamation.” (Naval Sea Systems Command, 
2003, pp. I-5). Depot maintenance is reported in Navy VAMOSC under Maintenance 
and Modernization – Depot, Other Depot. 
In 2009 VADM (Ret.) Phillip Balisle was directed to conduct a Fleet Review 
Panel (FRP) of surface force material readiness. The report noted that 4,052 billets 
were removed from Navy ships from 2001–2009.  While billets were removed from 
ships, requirements such as maintenance, damage control watches, training, and in 
port duties were not reduced (Balisle, 2010). The shortcomings of CBT described in 
the previous section exacerbated the problems experienced with manning 
reductions since sailors were not arriving on board with the right KSATs. The result 
was undermanned ships with poorly trained sailors with not enough time or know-
how to perform routine maintenance actions. 
In addition to reduced fleet manning, shore facilities also received manning 
cuts. This means that maintenance that was intended for intermediate maintenance 
activities was pushed back to ship personnel, which were undermanned and poorly 
trained.  In addition to the shrinking shore workforce, the amount of time the ships 
are available was shortened from 15 weeks to 9 weeks (Balisle, 2010). These 
actions resulted in equipment being out of commission for longer periods of time. 
Finally, the 2010 Balisle report noted that changes in PMS were made 
because ships couldn’t meet maintenance requirements due to reduced manning. 
Maintenance requirements were either eliminated or extended in periodicity. The 
intent was to shift maintenance requirements to shore facilities, but since manning 
was reduced ashore, many requirements went away completely. The elimination and 
extension of maintenance requirements can lead to more opportunities for 
equipment to become inoperable, resulting in degraded Fleet readiness (Balisle, 
2010). 
The Navy introduced several major changes to training, maintenance and 
manning policies during the early part of the 2000–2010 decade. The Balisle report 
found that training was a factor but certainly not the only factor that led to degraded 
Fleet readiness.  Manning reductions would have led to cost savings in the military 
personnel budget, but the impact of the reductions may have resulted in 
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maintenance cost increases in future budgets due to deferred maintenance actions, 
thus confounding the effect of CBT. Similarly, changes in maintenance policies may 
have impacted maintenance costs in future years.  
At a macro level the impact of CBT is impossible to tease out (see Gibson, 
2012, for an examination of Navy training, operations and maintenance budgets 
between 2000 and 2012).  For this reason, this study examines one system in 
particular, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system, collecting data at a level of detail that 
allows for the control of the various variables that might impact maintenance costs.. 
The AN/SQQ-89(V) Sonar System 
To examine the effect of CBT on rising maintenance costs, this study will 
focus on the O&S costs of a single Navy system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system, 
and look at  how the conversion to CBT affected maintenance costs in that system. 
We selected this system because it is fielded throughout the operational fleet before 
and after the implementation of CBT.  Analysis by Gibson in 2012 revealed that 
technicians did not change significantly from FYs 2000–2010, effectively eliminating 
manning as a contributor for the AN/SQQ-89 O&S costs and focusing the study on 
training and maintenance.  
The AN/SQQ-89(v) surface ship Anti-Submarine (ASW) Warfare combat 
system is an integrated network of sonar systems designed to search, detect, 
classify, and engage ASW threats. The system is currently installed on CG-47 class 
cruisers, DDG-51 class destroyers, and FFG-7 class frigates. The AN/SQQ-89(v) 
employs a variety of sensors that can transmit and receive acoustic data to detect 
and classify threats.(Jane's Information Group, 2010).  
The AN/SQQ-89 system consists of 15 different variants. Variants differ 
based on the sensors chosen and the version of each sensor.  In this report only 
variants 2, 3 4, 6, 7 and 9 were studied. These variants were chosen because they 
were on board ships prior to the introduction of CBT into the sonar training pipeline 
(2003) and remained on board after CBT was introduced. This allows for analysis of 
ship maintenance trends both prior to and after the introduction of CBT.  
All sonar technicians-surface (STGs) attend STG A school. At A school they 
learn the basic principles of oceanography and sound. Following A school, STGs 
who are strictly operators report to a Sonar Operator course, while maintainers 
attend C school, where they learn the technical skills required to maintain the 
equipment present on their reporting ship (Navy Personnel Command, 2012).  CBT 
was introduced full-time into the training pipeline in FY2003, after the 
recommendations of the ERNT report (Naval Inspector General, 2009). This study 
focuses on FYs 1999 through 2010 to capture data prior to and after the introduction 
of CBT.   
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Program Executive Office Integrated warfare System 5 (PEO IWS5) provided 
a list of ships equipped with the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system.  The list included ship 
class, ship name, hull number, homeport, and 89 variant number. Only ships with 
AN/SQQ-89(v) variants on board both before and after implementation of CBT were 
considered. The initial list provided by PEO IWS5 included all ships of the CG-47, 
DD-963, DDG-51, and FFG-7 classes. To narrow the ship list to match the scope of 
our study, ships were removed from the data set if: 
 The ship was decommissioned during the FY95-06 timeframe 
 The ship received a variant upgrade 
 The ship was commissioned FY2000 or later 
 The ship was outfitted with a variant introduced after FY03 
Using the above criteria, the ship list was reduced to 68 ships.  A list of ships 
per variant is given in Table 1. 
Table 1. List of Ships and AN/SQQ-89(v) System Variants used in this 
study 
 
(V)2 SHIP HOMEPORT (V)3 SHIP HOMEPORT (V)6 SHIP HOMEPORT
CG 55 LEYTE GULF Norfolk, VA CG 56 SAN JACINTO Norfolk, VA CG 68 ANZIO Norfolk, VA
FFG 8 MCINERNEY Mayport, FL CG 57 LAKE CHAMPLAIN San Diego, CA CG 69 VICKSBURG Mayport, FL
FFG 28 BOONE Mayport, FL CG 58 PHILIPPINE SEA Mayport, FL CG 70 LAKE ERIE Pearl Harbor, HI
FFG 29 STEPHEN W GROVESMayport, FL CG 71 CAPE ST GEORGE San Diego, CA
FFG 32 JOHN HALL Mayport, FL (V)4 SHIP HOMEPORT CG 72 VELLA GULF Norfolk, VA
FFG 33 JARRET San Diego, CA DDG 51 ARLEIGH BURKE Norfolk, VA DDG 52 BARRY Norfolk, VA
FFG 36 UNDERWOOD Mayport, FL DDG 53 JOHN PAUL JONES San Diego, CA
FFG 38 CURTS San Diego, CA DDG 54 CURTIS WILBUR Yokosuka, Japan
FFG 39 DOYLE Mayport, FL DDG 55 STOUT Norfolk, VA
FFG 40 HALYBURTON Mayport, FL DDG 56 JOHN S. MCCAIN Yokosuka, Japan
FFG 41 MCCLUSKY San Diego, CA DDG 57 MITSCHER Norfolk, VA
FFG 42 KLAKRING Mayport, FL DDG 58 LABOON Norfolk, VA
FFG 43 THACH San Diego, CA DDG 59 RUSSELL Pearl Harbor, HI
FFG 45 DE WERT Mayport, FL DDG 60 PAUL HAMILTON Pearl Harbor, HI
FFG 46 RENTZ San Diego, CA DDG 61 RAMAGE Norfolk, VA
FFG 47 NICHOLAS Norfolk, VA DDG 63 STETHEM Yokosuka, Japan
FFG 48 VANDEGRIFT San Diego, CA (V)7 SHIP HOMEPORT DDG 64 CARNEY Mayport, FL
FFG 49 ROBERT G BRADLEY Mayport, FL CG 66 HUE CITY Mayport, FL DDG 65 BENFOLD San Diego, CA
FFG 53 HAWES Norfolk, VA CG 67 SHILOH Yokosuka, Japan DDG 66 GONZALEZ Norfolk, VA
FFG 55 ELROD Norfolk, VA DDG 67 COLE Norfolk, VA
FFG 56 SIMPSON Mayport, FL (V)9 SHIP HOMEPORT DDG 68 THE SULLIVANS San Diego, CA
FFG 57 REUBEN JAMES Pearl Harbor, HI FFG 37 CROMMELIN Pearl Harbor, HI DDG 69 MILIUS San Diego, CA
FFG 58 SAMUEL B ROBERTS Mayport, FL FFG 50 TAYLOR Mayport, FL DDG 70 HOPPER Pearl Harbor, HI
FFG 59 KAUFFMAN Norfolk, VA FFG 51 GARY San Diego, CA DDG 71 ROSS Norfolk, VA
FFG 60 RODNEY M. DAVIS Everett, WA FFG 52 CARR Norfolk, VA DDG 72 MAHAN Norfolk, VA
FFG 61 INGRAHAM Everett, WA FFG 54 FORD Everett, WA DDG 73 DECATUR San Diego, CA
DDG 74 MCFAUL Norfolk, VA
DDG 75 DONALD COOK Norfolk, VA
DDG 76 HIGGINS San Diego, CA
DDG 77 O'KANE Pearl Harbor, HI
DDG 78 PORTER Norfolk, VA
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Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) 
provided O&S cost data, underway steaming days, and selected non-cost data for 
ships equipped with the AN/SQQ-89 sonar system covering FYs 1995 through 2010. 
Cost figures were given in then-year and constant FY2011 dollars.  
In addition to the AN/SQQ-89 sonar system data, detailed ship data was 
available for the selected ships. Non-cost data included number of personnel 
trained, maintenance manhours, and number of maintenance actions.  Table 2 
shows the variables used in our analysis and table 3 shows the descriptive statistics 
for the data. 
Table 2. Variables and data sources 





Cost of repair parts 


























Authorized on Board, 
E1 through E6 
Sailors authorized 





Navy Manning Plan, 
E1 through E6 
Sailors planned for a 




Currently on Board, 
E1 through E6 
Sailors on board a 





Days Underway Days spent at sea Days VAMOSC 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Series N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Organizational Parts Costs 802 8439.80 9434.82 0 65839.71 
Corrective Maintenance Actions 793 75.10 54.05 4 447 
Organizational Labor Hours 801 1012.60 1029.57 7 12079 
Authorized on Board, E1 through E6 808 12.66 3.66 6 18 
Navy Manning Plan, E1 through E6 812 12.8 4.09 5 20 
Currently on Board, E1 through E6 811 12.92 4.13 4 24 
Days Underway 543 135.80 48.77 24 281 
A graphical analysis by Gibson in 2012 indicated noticeable changes after the 
introduction of CBT. For example, Labor Ashore—Intermediate Maintenance 
Manhours showed significant change (see Figure 1).  The figure shows number of 
manhours spent on IM for selected ships from FYs 1995 through 2010. Beginning in 
FY04, the IM manhours increased significantly for the selected DDG-51 and CG-47 
class ships.   
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Figure 1. Labor Ashore - Intermediate Maintenance Manhours 
Analysis & Results 
To test the hypothesis of whether the introduction of CBT significantly 
influenced system maintenance and operation we define three dependent variables 
of interest: Organization Parts Costs (OrgParts), Corrective Organizational and 
Intermediate Maintenance Actions (OrgActions), and Organization Labor Man-Hours 
(Orghours). If CBT does not detract from sailor ability, then we expect CBT to have 
no (or negative) impact on the dependent variables. If CBT does not adequately 
prepare sailors for operating and maintaining these systems when compared to 
traditional training, then we expect an increase in parts costs, maintenance actions, 
and man-hours. 
Computer Based Training (CBT) is a dummy variable that is 0 before 2004 
and 1 afterwards.  Billets authorized for enlisted grades E-1 to E-6 (BAE), the Navy 
Manning Plan for enlisted personnel in grades E-1 to E-6 (NMPE), number of 
enlisted in grades E-1 to E-6 currently on board (COBE), and the number of days 
underway in a given fiscal year (UW) are used as control variables.  A matrix Z 
includes the radar variant, radar’s installation year, type of ship, and homeport 
location.  The data collected can be characterized as panel data and the following 
general estimation form is used:  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 12 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
  (1) 
where   and    denote the unobservable individual ship and time effects, 
respectively. The term     is a random walk. The subscripts   and   denote ship and 
time period, respectively.  
To examine the hypothesized influence of CBT on AN/SQQ-89(v) parts costs, 
maintenance man hours, and maintenance actions, only those variants on board 
prior to and following CBT’s introduction into the A and C schools are used. Of the 
fifteen possible variants, data on five variants are used for the empirical analysis 
from FY 1999 through FY 2010. The final data set contains 526 observations on 68 
ships from FY 1999 to FY 2010.  
Results from pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators are presented 
in Table 4.  The analysis explicitly assumes that CBT is exogenous to the dependent 
variables since CBT is a policy decision. The results indicate that the use of CBT 
has adversely influenced parts costs, actions, and labor hours associated with 
operating and maintaining the AN/SQQ-89(v). This result is consistent when we 
control for the type of ship, radar variant, homeport, and unobservable ship and time 
characteristics. These results suggest that the navy has traded an explicit training 
cost for an obscured cost in terms of parts, maintenance actions, labor hours, and 
readiness. 
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Notes: **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Our analysis suggests that using CBT increases Organizational Parts Costs 
by approximately $4,971 per year at the 1% level of significance. For a given system 
on a ship, this suggests a 20 to 50% increase in maintenance costs over time.  We 
also find that CBT increases Corrective Maintenance Actions by approximately 32 
per year at the 1% level of significance. For a given system on a ship, this suggests 
a significant percentage increase in maintenance actions.  Finally,  we estimate  that 
introducing CBT inflates the number of Organization Labor Hours by 730 hours at 
the 1% level of significance. 
Our results support the anecdotal arguments that CBT negatively impacts 
sailor performance on ships, affecting parts costs, maintenance actions, and 
maintenance labor hours. While limited to one system, this result suggests that the 
navy has reduced the cost of labor and equipment in schoolhouses at the expense 
of operational cost and effectiveness (parts, maintenance, and labor hours) on board 
ships.  
Conclusion 
In 2001, ERNT released its report, Revolution in Training: Executive Review 
of Navy Training Final Report, which led to a major overhaul in the US Navy’s 
training practices, including the use of CBT in A and C schools.  Anecdotal evidence 
from the Fleet suggested that the quality of training received by sailors through CBT 
was not as good as the training received in traditional schoolhouses.  While 
government studies of the Navy’s CBT training confirmed that the transition to CBT 
resulted in shorter training times and cost savings, sailors reporting to the Fleet were 
not as well prepared as classroom-trained sailors of the past and extensive OJT, 
supervision, and assistance in performing basic maintenance tasks were required to 
bring CBT-trained sailors up to speed. 
This study looked at costs from a systems perspective, considering not only 
the cost of training but also at the cost of maintenance.  We asked the question: If 
sailors trained with CBT had lower knowledge and skill levels, did this contribute to 
increased operations and maintenance costs?  
Unfortunately there were too many confounding variables that could have 
affected O&M costs during this period of time to draw any conclusions about the 
effect of CBT on maintenance costs from the Navy level.  Instead, we focus on a 
single Navy system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system, to examine the effects of the 
conversion to CBT on maintenance. Controlling for the navy's planning for manning 
the system, the number of billets authorized, and the number of personnel on board, 
we find that CBT adversely impacted costs, actions, and maintenance hours. These 
findings provide, for the first time in the literature, empirical evidence CBT’s negative 
impacts, including rising Fleet maintenance costs. 
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While it seems reasonable that CBT may lower costs and maintain quality for 
relatively simple tasks, it may not be as effective for specialized, knowledge-
intensive skills.  Future research should explore whether CBT has affected other 
systems in a similar manner. This question is of direct policy and financial interest to 
the navy; navy expenditures may rise from increases in costs and actions.  
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